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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1968, in Flast v. Cohen,2 the Supreme Court first set forth the
requirements that a plaintiff must satisfy to have standing to challenge a
government action in federal court solely based on his or her status as a
taxpayer.3 The subsequent history of taxpayer standing is littered with
precedents supported by unclear reasoning.4 Hein v. Freedom from
1. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
2. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
3. Id. at 102-03. See infra Parts II(B)(3) and IV(A) for a description of the test for taxpayer
standing set forth in Flast.
4. Both legal commentators and members of the judiciary have criticized the Court’s
decisions on taxpayer standing as being difficult to reconcile and setting forth conflicting rationales.
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III
standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this
Court which have discussed it . . . .”); Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(describing the Court’s taxpayer standing jurisprudence as having consistently created “utterly
meaningless distinctions” to distinguish plaintiffs who have standing from plaintiffs who do not);
Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 691 (1990)
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Religion Foundation, Inc. represents the Supreme Court’s latest effort to
address the limits of taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause5
challenge.6 Unfortunately, the Court in Hein maintained its tradition of
providing perplexing decisions in taxpayer standing cases.7
In Hein, a plurality8 of the justices, claiming to have left the
holding of Flast undisturbed, denied the plaintiffs standing to challenge
Executive Branch discretionary expenditures alleged to violate the
Establishment Clause.9 This note examines the Hein decision to
determine if the impact of the decision is truly to leave the Flast holding
unchanged, as the plurality claims, or if, as the author believes, the
decision actually modifies the Flast holding by adding a new distinction
between expenditures of earmarked and generally appropriated funds.10
Part II provides a brief background on the concept of standing and
provides a history of the Court’s treatment of taxpayer standing.11 Part
III identifies the facts and issues presented in the Hein case and
describes the Supreme Court’s decision and the lower courts’ decisions
in order to give appropriate context for an examination of the impact of
Hein.12 Part IV analyzes the Court’s decision to show that in fact a
majority of the justices voted to alter the Flast holding and that the new
distinction introduced by the plurality is not supported by the Court’s
precedent.13 Finally, this note analyzes the impact of the Court’s
decision on plaintiffs asserting taxpayer standing in future cases and on
actions the Federal executive and legislative branches might take to
avoid the possibility of judicial challenges to their actions.14

(describing the distinctions drawn by the Valley Forge Court between plaintiffs as “senseless”);
Richard M. Elias, Note, Confusion in the Realm of Taxpayer Standing: The State of State Taxpayer
Standing in the Eighth Circuit, 66 MO. L. REV. 413, 430 (2001) (“The Supreme Court's application
of different and unclear standards to different classes of taxpayers is hard to reconcile . . . .”).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
6. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2555.
7. See infra Parts III, IV.
8. The Court denied the plaintiffs standing with three justices joining the plurality opinion
and two justices concurring in the judgment who sought to overrule Flast entirely. See infra Part
III(C).
9. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572 (“We leave Flast as we found it”).
10. See infra Part IV. This note does not present a defense of Flast or taxpayer standing
generally, nor does this note seek to criticize Flast’s central holding.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV(C).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Court Standing
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the power of the
federal judiciary “to say what the law is”15 has limits.16 The limits that
the Court has recognized assure that the judiciary’s determinations
regarding the law only occur within the context of a case that is properly
resolved in the judicial context.17 Plaintiff standing is but one of several
essential elements needed for a case to be justiciable.18
Federal court standing doctrine arises from the Article III19
limitation on the federal judicial power to hear only “cases” and
“controversies” as well as prudential limitations the Court has imposed
on itself.20 The standing requirements that the Supreme Court has
articulated purport to assure that the person asserting the claim is the
proper party to bring the suit.21 The Court considers a person to be a
proper party to bring the suit if he or she has a sufficient “stake in the
outcome” to assure that there is adequate adversity between the parties
to illuminate both sides of the issues before the court.22 To assure this
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
16. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 302 (2004) (discussing the Court’s recognition of
limitations on the judicial power as early as 1793).
17. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
18. Id. at 95. The Court has held cases non-justiciable where: (1) the parties request only an
advisory opinion, (2) the case involves a political question that is left to the political branches to
decide, (3) the case has been mooted, and (4) the plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the action. Id.
The concept of standing has occasionally been confused with the larger question of justiciability.
Id. at 98-99.
19. U.S. CONST. art. III. Article III defines the limits on the judicial power of the United
States as follows:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. § 2.
20. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 94. The prudential limitations include “the general prohibition on a
litigant's raising another person's legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances
more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984).
21. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99-100.
22. Id. at 99 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
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“stake in the outcome,” the Supreme Court has identified three elements
that every plaintiff must show to establish standing in the federal courts:
(1) a “concrete and particularized” injury, (2) a “fairly traceable” causal
relation between the injury and the defendant’s actions, and (3) a
likelihood that a favorable decision by the court would redress the
injury.23 The Supreme Court has reasoned that a plaintiff who can
satisfy all three elements has a sufficient stake in the outcome of the
proceeding to establish a genuine case or controversy.24
B. Taxpayer Standing25
Although all plaintiffs in federal court must establish standing to
have their case heard, this question is often not in dispute.26 However,
the issue of standing frequently arises in cases where a plaintiff
challenges a governmental action claiming standing based on his or her
status as a taxpayer.27 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
Court has not clearly defined the requirements for federal court standing,
but an examination of the Court’s decisions in the area of taxpayer
standing helps one understand how the Court has treated the taxpayer
plaintiff.28 The following discussion of the history of the Supreme
23. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
24. The requirement to show a “concrete and particularized” injury narrows the population of
parties who may bring suit to those directly affected by the alleged unlawful conduct. See Allen,
468 U.S. at 755-56. If there were no requirement for a personal injury, essentially any person could
bring suit to challenge any alleged wrongful act whether or not the person suffered any harm. Id.
The requirement to allege an injury “fairly traceable” to defendant’s conduct assures that the causal
chain between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct is sufficiently direct to assure that
the plaintiff is suing the proper defendant (i.e., the party whose conduct is the source of plaintiff’s
injury). Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). The question of
redressability, which is closely related to the “fairly traceable” inquiry, assures there is a “causal
connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
The redressability requirement assures that the relief the court may grant will be effective at
rectifying the plaintiff’s injury. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88, 106-07
(1998) (reasoning that environmental group failed to show they had a redressible injury where they
filed suit against steel manufacturer for a “historical violation” of a reporting requirement).
25. “Taxpayer standing” is used in this note to refer to the circumstance where a plaintiff
asserts standing to challenge a governmental action alleging an injury based on his or her status as a
taxpayer.
26. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.15 (2007) (“the plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving
standing”).
27. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxpayers in Court: A Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood)
Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771 (2003) (surveying taxpayer challenges in federal courts).
28. Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“[T]he concept [of standing] cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or oneparagraph definition.”).
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Court’s decisions illustrates the contours of the standing inquiries that
the Court has undertaken in taxpayer suits.
In a series of cases leading up to Hein, the Supreme Court
addressed taxpayer standing as it relates to challenges to federal
governmental actions under the Establishment Clause29 and other
constitutional provisions.30 After initially formulating a rule against
taxpayer standing,31 the Court eventually recognized a path for taxpayer
plaintiffs to establish federal court standing.32 These earlier decisions
are critical to the Court’s decision in Hein and are necessary to
understand the full impact of Hein on future plaintiffs.33
1. The General Rule Against Taxpayer Standing - Frothingham v.
Mellon34
The Supreme Court first took up the issue of taxpayer standing in
Frothingham v. Mellon.35 The plaintiff alleged that the Maternity Act36
was unconstitutional and sought an injunction to prevent the Secretary of
the Treasury from enforcing the law.37 The claimed injury was the
increase in future taxes due to expenditures in violation of the
Constitution.38 The Court recognized that local taxpayers had a right to
sue a municipal corporation to prevent unlawful expenditures, but denied
that such a right extended to the federal taxpayers’ interest in federal
funds.39

29. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
30. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2563-65 (2007)
(reviewing these cases).
31. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-88 (1923) (holding that taxpayers could not
establish standing to challenge federal appropriations).
32. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) (recognizing an exception to Frothingham in
which taxpayers may establish standing).
33. See infra Parts III, IV.
34. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
35. Id. at 486.
36. Maternity Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-97, 42 Stat. 224 (1921). The Maternity Act
appropriated money to each state conditioned upon each state’s acceptance of the act’s provisions
for reducing maternal and infant mortality. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 479.
37. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486. The plaintiff alleged the act was unconstitutional in that it
invaded the states’ powers reserved under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 479; U.S. CONST. amend.
X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
38. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
39. Id. at 487.
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The Court identified several reasons for its conclusion.40 First, it
reasoned that a taxpayer’s interest in the federal treasury was “minute
and indeterminable” and that the impact of the expenditures on future
taxes was too “remote, fluctuating and uncertain” to state a valid claim.41
Second, the Court expressed its belief that the taxpayer’s claim was a
question of public policy and not a matter to be tried by an individual in
court.42 Third, the Court was concerned about the possible flooding of
the courts with taxpayer suits if such claims were allowed.43 Finally, the
Court saw the hearing of taxpayer claims as a potential invasion of the
province of the co-equal branches.44
The Court held that a person challenging the validity of a statute
must show that enforcement of the statute has caused him or her a direct
injury and not just that he or she “suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally.”45 The Court provided no guidance as
to what circumstances, if any, would give a taxpayer standing to
challenge a federal act.46
2. Taxpayer Standing and the Establishment Clause - Doremus v.
Board of Education47
The Court first considered whether taxpayer status would be
sufficient to sustain a challenge to the Establishment Clause in Doremus
v. Board of Education.48 In Doremus, two individuals brought suit in
state court for a declaratory judgment that a state law49 requiring reading

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The justification of the issue being a public matter extends beyond the notion of
standing and is best considered an alternative ground for holding the question to be non-justiciable,
namely a “political question” dedicated to the Legislative and Executive Branches. See Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968); see supra note 18.
43. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
44. Id. at 488.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 488-489.
47. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
48. Id. at 430-431.
49. The challenged act stated:
At least five verses taken from that portion of the Holy Bible known as the Old
Testament shall be read, or caused to be read, without comment, in each public school
classroom, in the presence of the pupils therein assembled, by the teacher in charge, at
the opening of school upon every school day, unless there is a general assemblage of the
classes at the opening of the school on any school day, in which event the reading shall
be done, or caused to be done, by the principal or teacher in charge of the assemblage
and in the presence of the classes so assembled.
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of Bible verses in public schools violated the Establishment Clause.50
The two plaintiffs asserted taxpayer status as their basis for standing.51
The Court dismissed their claim, finding no justiciable case or
controversy.52 The Court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged
injuries as taxpayers sufficient to establish standing.53 The plaintiffs
failed to allege that the challenged act had added to their tax burden or
even that the Bible readings affected the cost of running the school.54
The Court stated that plaintiffs can establish standing in their taxpayer
capacity, but they must show an actual or threatened financial injury.55
The Court further noted that if a taxpayer could show financial injury
then the fact that his or her principal motivation for bringing suit may be
non-financial would not deprive the taxpayer of standing.56
Three justices in dissent believed that an individual taxpayer’s
interest in taxes being “deflected from the educational program for
which the taxes were raised” was sufficient injury to establish standing.57
The dissent claimed the clash of interests was sufficient to hold that
there was a real case or controversy.58
3. An Exception to the Frothingham Rule - Flast v. Cohen59
Flast v. Cohen first cracked the barrier that had prevented taxpayer
plaintiffs from asserting standing to challenge federal action as

Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 71 A.2d 732, 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1950) (quoting N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 18:14-77 (West 1937)). The statute itself did not impose a tax nor did it specify any
expenditure of funds for the activity.
50. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 430-31. The case was before the Court on appeal from the Supreme
Court of New Jersey. Id. at 430. The New Jersey courts rejected the plaintiffs’ claims and upheld
the challenged act on the merits. Id. The New Jersey courts were not bound by Article III’s case
and controversy requirements, but the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over cases appealed from state
courts, even if they present cognizable subject matter, are still subject to the Article III standing
restrictions. See id. at 431, 433.
51. Id. at 432. One of the individuals had a daughter at a public school, but there was no
assertion that the daughter was injured by the practice of Bible reading. Id. Additionally, the
daughter had graduated prior to the appeal, rendering moot the individual’s status as a father of a
possibly affected student. Id. at 432-33.
52. Id. at 435.
53. Id. at 434-35.
54. Id. at 433.
55. Id. at 434-35.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 435 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 436.
59. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
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unconstitutional.60 The Flast plaintiffs challenged a congressional act
that provided federal grants to finance education in religious schools.61
The plaintiffs rested their standing solely on their federal taxpayer
status.62
The Court first examined whether its earlier refusal to recognize
taxpayer standing was grounded in the constitutional limitations on
judicial power or rather on prudential grounds of self-restraint.63 The
Court found indications in its Frothingham decision to suggest that the
earlier refusal to recognize taxpayer standing was based on prudential
and not purely constitutional grounds.64 The Court determined that there
was sufficient confusion underlying the Frothingham decision to warrant
reexamination of the hard-line approach adopted in Frothingham.65
In analyzing the “cases” and “controversies” language of Article
III, the Court noted two complementary limitations that arise: (1) a need
for adversariness in resolution of the dispute in the judicial process and
(2) a restriction on the judiciary intruding into the territory of the coequal branches of the government.66 The Court stated that the standing
inquiry, as opposed to other elements of justiciability,67 focuses solely
on the first of these limitations and not on the separation-of-powers

60. Id. at 102-04; Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2564-65
(2007) (explaining the significance of the Flast decision in justiciability jurisprudence).
61. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85. The plaintiffs challenged the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27. Id. The Act permitted the United States Commissioner
of Education to provide grants to local educational agencies that served areas with high
concentrations of low-income families. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-10, § 202, 79 Stat. 27, 27. The challenged section permitted a local education agency to
receive a grant provided
that, to the extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the
school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private elementary
and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including special
educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and
television, and mobile educational services and equipment) in which such children can
participate.
Id. § 205(a)(2), 79 Stat. at 30-31 (emphasis added).
62. Flast, 392 U.S. at 85.
63. Id. at 92.
64. Id. at 93 (“The concluding sentence of the [Frothingham] opinion states that, to take
jurisdiction of the taxpayer's suit, ‘would be not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority
which plainly we do not possess.’ Yet the concrete reasons given for denying standing to a federal
taxpayer suggest that the Court's holding rests on something less than a constitutional foundation.”).
65. Id. at 93-94.
66. Id. at 95.
67. See supra note 18 (listing the other elements of justiciability).
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concerns raised by the second limitation.68 For a party to show the
necessary stake in the outcome of the proceeding, the party must show a
“logical nexus” between his or her asserted status and the claim.69 For a
taxpayer suit, the Court defined a two-prong test to show this “logical
nexus.”70 First, the plaintiff must show a logical link between his or her
taxpayer status and the type of congressional enactment being
challenged.71 Second, the plaintiff must show a link between the
taxpayer status and the alleged constitutional infringement.72
The first prong nexus required the plaintiff to challenge an exercise
of Congress’s taxing and spending power.73 The first prong also
required that the challenged exercise of the spending power not be
merely “an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of
an essentially regulatory statute.”74 The second prong required the
plaintiff to show the expenditure exceeded a “specific constitutional
limitation[]” on the spending power.75
The Court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied both parts of the
test.76 The plaintiffs satisfied the first prong by challenging, as
taxpayers, an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power
involving a “substantial expenditure of federal tax funds.”77 The Court
found the second prong satisfied because the Establishment Clause was a
specific limitation on Congress’s taxing and spending power,78 noting
that the injury to the taxpayer was “that his tax money [was] being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against such abuses of legislative power.”79
Justice Harlan, the lone dissenting justice, criticized the majority’s
two-part test as establishing criteria that in no way impacted the
plaintiff’s actual stake in the outcome of the case.80 In arguing against

68. Flast, 392 U.S. at 100-01. The standing question focuses on the person, and whether he
or she is a proper party. Id. A plaintiff is a proper party to bring suit if he or she has a sufficient
stake in the outcome and an adverse interest to the defendant. Id. at 101. “[I]t is not relevant that
the substantive issues in the litigation might be nonjusticiable.” Id.
69. Id. at 102.
70. Id. See infra Part IV(A) for a detailed analysis of the Flast test.
71. Id. at 102.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 102-03.
76. Id. at 103.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 105-06.
79. Id. at 106.
80. Id. at 121-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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the first prong of the test, Justice Harlan stated that a plaintiff’s interest
in the outcome of a suit is not affected by the nature of the governmental
expenditure.81 Justice Harlan specifically noted the taxpayer’s interest
arose from the unlawful expenditure regardless of whether the
expenditure was a grant to a religious organization or incidental to a
regulatory program.82 Justice Harlan also disagreed with the second
prong of the test, finding no basis to distinguish between specific
restrictions on the spending power, such as the Establishment Clause,
and other constitutional limitations on the spending power.83
Justice Harlan saw a taxpayer’s right to challenge the expenditure
of funds as no greater than that of any citizen.84 Although Justice Harlan
believed a taxpayer’s or citizen’s challenges to unconstitutional
expenditures to be within the case and controversy requirements of
Article III, he nonetheless thought that the Court should refuse to hear
such claims on prudential grounds.85 Specifically, Justice Harlan saw
taxpayer suits as leading to an intrusion by the judiciary into the
authority of the Legislative and Executive Branches.86
4. Applying the Flast Test
The Court’s first application of the Flast test to other facts occurred
in two cases, decided on the same day, that involved non-Establishment
Clause challenges: United States v. Richardson87 and Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War.88 These cases are particularly
illustrative of the Court’s rigid application of the Flast test.

81. Id. at 122-23. Justice Harlan distinguished between taxpayer challenges to the validity of
their personal tax obligations for which he had no problem finding a justiciable issue and taxpayer
challenges to expenditures from the treasury where there was no allegation that the plaintiff’s tax
obligation was actually greater. Id. at 118.
82. Id. at 123.
83. Id. at 126.
84. Id. at 119.
85. Id. at 130-31.
86. Id. at 130. Justice Harlan noted, “the other branches of the Government ‘are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree of as the courts.’” Id.
at 131 (quoting Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
He would have allowed taxpayer or citizen suits only in cases where legislation had authorized the
federal courts to hear such suits. Id. at 131-32.
87. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
88. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
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a. United States v. Richardson89
In United States v. Richardson, the Court addressed a plaintiff’s
challenge to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.90 The
plaintiff challenged the act as violating the Constitution’s Statement and
Account Clause91 and asserted his taxpayer status as basis for his
standing.92 Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the act’s provision
protecting against public disclosure of an account of Central Intelligence
Agency expenditures violated the constitutional requirement for periodic
publication of an account of government expenditures.93
In denying the plaintiff standing, the Court found that the plaintiff
failed to satisfy the Flast test because the plaintiff made “no claim that
appropriated funds [were] being spent in violation of a ‘specific
constitutional limitation upon the . . . taxing and spending power.’”94
Since the plaintiff failed to establish the nexus between his taxpayer
status and his claim, the Court found the plaintiff’s claim to be a nonjusticiable “generalized grievance” common to all citizens.95
b. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War96
At the same time it decided Richardson, the Court also denied
standing to a group of plaintiffs who challenged several congressmen’s
membership in the Armed Forces Reserve.97 The plaintiffs alleged that
the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause98 rendered members of
Congress ineligible for participation in the Armed Forces Reserve.99 In
addressing the plaintiffs’ claim of standing based on their status as
taxpayers, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to challenge an

89. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
90. Id. at 167; Pub. L. No. 81-110, 63 Stat. 208.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A] regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”).
92. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 167-68.
93. Id. at 168.
94. Id. at 175 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104 (1968)). The injury alleged by the
plaintiff was that he was deprived information that he needed to fulfill his duties as an elector of
public officials. Id. at 176.
95. Id. at 176-77. In addition to denying the plaintiff standing as a taxpayer, the Court
recognized that no taxpayer would likely be able to bring a suit to challenge the constitutionality of
the act and left the question for the political process to resolve. Id. at 179.
96. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
97. Id. at 210-11.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
99. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 210-11.
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exercise of the taxing and spending power.100 The Court characterized
the claim as a challenge to “the action of the Executive Branch in
permitting Members of Congress to maintain their Reserve status.”101
Since the plaintiffs’ claim was not a challenge to the taxing and spending
power, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy Flast’s
first prong.102
c. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc.103
Both Richardson and Schlesinger showed the Court’s respect for
Flast’s first prong requirement that a taxpayer plaintiff challenge an
exercise of the taxing and spending power in non-Establishment Clause
cases.104 If there were any doubt that the Court would also rigidly apply
Flast’s first prong to challenges brought under the Establishment Clause,
that doubt was dispelled in Valley Forge.105 In Valley Forge, the
plaintiffs challenged the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare’s
transfer of property owned by the federal government to a private
Christian college for allegedly less than adequate consideration.106 The
plaintiffs alleged that the Federal Property and Administrative Services
Act of 1949107 as applied to the particular property transfer was
unconstitutional in that it violated the Establishment Clause.108
The Court applied the Flast two-prong test to reject the plaintiffs’
assertion of taxpayer standing.109 First, the Court found that the act of
which they complained was not an act of Congress.110 Rather, it was a
100. Id. at 228.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
104. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
105. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 481 (“Any doubt that once might have existed concerning
the rigor with which the Flast exception to the Frothingham principle ought to be applied should
have been erased by this Court’s recent decisions . . . .”).
106. Id. at 468.
107. Pub. L. No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377. The Act permitted the Secretary to dispose of surplus
property by selling it to private parties. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 467. The price of the sale could
be reduced based on a “public benefit allowance” if the subsequent use of the property would
benefit the United States. Id. For the challenged transfer, a one hundred percent allowance was
provided in exchange for a condition in the grant requiring that the property be used solely for
educational purposes for thirty years. Id. at 468.
108. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 469. “The complaint asserted that each member ‘would be
deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes in
violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.’” Id.
109. Id. at 479.
110. Id.
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decision by the Executive Branch.111 Second, the Court found the source
of authority for the transfer was the Property Clause112 and not the
Taxing and Spending Clause.113 The Court focused on the plaintiffs’
failure to allege a concrete injury and raised many of the same prudential
considerations raised in Frothingham v. Mellon.114
d. Bowen v. Kendrick115
After Valley Forge, there was reason to believe that the allowance
for taxpayer standing was effectively dead even though Flast had not
been overruled.116 However, Bowen v. Kendrick showed that taxpayer
plaintiffs still had a path to federal court standing under Flast.117 In
Bowen, taxpayers claimed that grants made under the Adolescent Family
Life Act118 violated the Establishment Clause.119 The government
challenged the plaintiffs’ standing on the grounds that the challenged
grants were administered and authorized by the Executive Branch and
therefore did not involve an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending
power.120 The Court rejected the government’s contention, holding that

111. Id.
112. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States . . . .”).
113. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 480.
114. Id. at 472-76. The Court considered the requirement for an actual injury necessary to
provide a “concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action.” Id. at 472. The Court also expressed concern about converting the courts into
forums for hearing public grievances. Id. at 473. The Court raised the issue of intrusion onto the
provinces of the Legislative and Executive Branches, finding that declaring an act of a co-equal
branch unconstitutional is a “tool of last resort” that should not be done unless “in the proper
performance of a judicial function.” Id. at 473-74.
115. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
116. See Eric B. Schnurer, Note, “More than an Intuition, Less than a Theory”: Toward a
Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 564, 566 (1986) (concluding that Richardson
and Valley Forge rendered Flast a “dead letter”).
117. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619-20. Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 591. This is noted because these justices also concurred in the judgment in Hein v. Freedom
from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
118. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 955, 95 Stat. 357, 578 (1981). The Act provided for grants to public
and private organizations to address adolescent pregnancy and sexual relations. Bowen, 487 U.S. at
593. The Secretary of Health and Human Services was charged with administration of the grants.
Id. at 594. The private organizations given grants included religious organizations. Id. at 597.
119. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 597. The plaintiffs challenged the Act as unconstitutional both on its
face and as applied to grants given to religious organizations. Id. The Court held that the Act was
not facially invalid. Id. at 593. The Court’s standing analysis related to the as-applied challenge.
Id. at 618.
120. Id. at 619.
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administration of the funds by the Executive Branch did not make the
grants any less an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power.121
This signaled a retreat from Valley Forge’s reliance on the executivecongressional action distinction, indicating that the true basis for Valley
Forge was the distinction between actions taken under the Taxing and
Spending Clause versus those under the Property Clause.122 The Court
also found the grants were not incidental expenditures of funds “in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute” because the
challenged program was primarily a program of fund disbursement
enacted pursuant to Congress’s taxing and spending powers.123 The
Court determined that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the grant
program “as applied” and remanded to the District Court to decide on
the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.124
After Bowen, it was clear that the Flast test remained a valid but
rigidly applied exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing.125
This was the status of federal taxpayer standing doctrine when the Court
considered Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.126
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
On January 29, 2001, President Bush established the White House
Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (“the White House
OFBCI”) and Executive Department Centers for Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives (“the Department Centers”).127 The stated
purpose of the Department Centers was to “coordinate department
efforts to eliminate regulatory, contracting and other programmatic
obstacles to the participation of faith-based and other community

121. Id.
122. See id. at 619 (“This is not a case like Valley Forge, where the challenge was to an
exercise of executive authority pursuant to the Property Clause . . . .”).
123. Id. (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
124. Id. at 619-21.
125. See id. at 618 (“[W]e have consistently adhered to Flast and the narrow exception it
created to the general rule against taxpayer standing . . . .”).
126. 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007).
127. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 3 C.F.R. 752-54 (2001) (establishing the White House OFBCI)
and Exec. Order No. 13,198, 3 C.F.R. 750-52 (2001) (establishing department centers for FBCI
under the Attorney General, the Secretary of Education, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development).
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organizations in the provision of social services.”128 The directors of the
White House OFBCI and the Department Centers were alleged to have
supported and made speeches at government-sponsored conferences
where faith-based organizations were identified as being “particularly
worthy of federal funding because of their religious orientation.”129
There was no congressional mandate to establish either the White House
OFBCI or the Department Centers.130
B. Procedural History
The Freedom from Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)131 and individual
members of the FFRF (“the Plaintiffs”) sought declaratory and
injunctive relief in the Western District of Wisconsin alleging that the
Defendant Directors of the White House OFBCI and Department
Centers used congressional appropriations to give preference to faithbased organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause.132 The

128. Exec. Order No. 13,198, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 750.
129. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 73a, Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2553 (No. 06-157) (Aug. 1, 2006), 2006 WL 2161324 (reproducing Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint at Appendix E), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/ briefs/2006/2pet/7pet/20060157.pet.aa.pdf. The District Court’s decision and subsequent appeals arise from defendants’
partial motion to dismiss for which the Court assumed the accuracy of the Plaintiffs’ allegations. Id.
at 28a (reproducing the district court’s order in Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Towey, No.
04-C-381-S (W.D. Wis. decided Nov. 15, 2004) at Appendix B).
130. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 33a (concluding that there is no
congressional mandate because the OFBCI was established by executive order and funded by
general budget appropriations).
131. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc (“FFRF”), is a Wisconsin-based corporation
“opposed to government endorsement of religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.” Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 68a. FFRF describes itself as “an educational group
working for the separation of state and church” with purposes “to promote the constitutional
principle of separation of state and church, and to educate the public on matters relating to
nontheism.” Freedom from Religion Foundation, http://www.ffrf.org/purposes/ (last visited Oct.
29, 2008). FFRF pursues these purposes by filing lawsuits, publishing newsletters and books,
sponsoring free thought essay competitions, providing public speakers, and holding annual
conventions, among other activities. Id.
132. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 77a. The amended complaint also
alleged that the Department Secretaries directly funded services that integrated religion in violation
of the Establishment Clause and that “funded intermediary faith-based organizations that
preferentially award sub-grants to other faith-based organizations.” Id. at 79a. The Plaintiffs
voluntarily dismissed all but two of these claims. Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Towey,
No. 04-C-381-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39444, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 11, 2005). The district court
granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, finding an Establishment Clause violation
with respect to grants to MentorKids USA, a faith-based program for mentoring children of
prisoners. Id. at *28-29. The district court also partially granted Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, upholding a grant made to Emory University. Id. at *29.
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Plaintiffs asserted standing based on their federal-taxpayer status.133 In
applying the Flast two-prong test, the district court found that the
challenged activities were not sufficiently related to an exercise of
Congress’s taxing and spending power to satisfy Flast’s first prong.134
The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ claims against the Defendant
Directors for lack of standing, reasoning that the Plaintiffs had failed to
establish a sufficient link between the Defendant Directors’ actions and a
congressional enactment.135
A divided panel for Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the
dismissal and remanded for judgment on the merits.136 The Seventh
Circuit held that Plaintiffs could assert standing as taxpayers because the
challenged program was funded by congressional appropriations, even
though such funds were from general Executive Branch
appropriations.137 The Seventh Circuit paid particular attention to the
Supreme Court’s statement in Flast that it would not be sufficient for a
plaintiff to merely challenge “an incidental expenditure of tax funds in
the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.”138 The Seventh
Circuit determined that “incidental” did not refer to the magnitude of the
expenditure.139 Instead, the test used for determining if an expenditure
were more than merely “incidental” was whether the implementation of
the regulatory program that allegedly violated the Establishment Clause
involved an expenditure of funds greater than what the expenditure
would have been in implementing the program in a manner that did not

133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 30a.
134. Id. at 34a (finding the challenged actions to not to be “exercises of congressional power”).
135. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 129, at 33a-34a. The district court stated that
the general rule is that “status as a federal taxpayer is insufficient to convey standing to challenge
federal expenditures.” Id. at 31a (citing Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923)). The
court then considered the exception to the general rule provided by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
102-03 (1968). Id. at 31a. The court found the second element of the test satisfied because the
Establishment Clause limits Congress’s taxing and spending power. Id. at 32a (citing Flast, 392
U.S. at 104). The district court held the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first element of the test in that
the Defendant Directors were not charged with administration of congressional programs. Id. at
34a.
136. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 997 (7th Cir. 2006).
137. Id. at 996-97. Judge Posner, writing for the court, saw no reason why a standing
determination would rest on whether the challenged funds were from a general appropriation rather
than a specific congressional grant. Id. at 994. He believed that equally egregious violations of the
Establishment Clause could result from Executive Branch expenditures of general appropriations as
could result from expenditures provided for in a legislative enactment. Id. at 994-95.
138. Id. at 995 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
139. Id.
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violate the Establishment Clause.140 In applying this incremental cost
test, the Seventh Circuit determined that the Plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the OFBCI as a program because it involved expenditures that
were more than just “incidental” to other executive functions.141
C. United States Supreme Court Decision
In 2006, the Supreme Court granted Defendants’ petition for writ of
certiorari.142 The Court considered the question “[w]hether taxpayers
have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge, on
Establishment Clause grounds, the actions of Executive Branch officials
pursuant to an Executive Order, where the conduct at issue is financed
only indirectly through general appropriations legislation and no funds
are disbursed to any institutions or individuals outside the
government.”143
1. Plurality Opinion144
The plurality examined earlier cases where the Court had evaluated
taxpayer standing, noting that the Plaintiffs did not challenge collection
of a tax assessment and only challenged the expenditure of collected
funds.145 The plurality reiterated the Frothingham146 general rule against
taxpayer standing in cases challenging the expenditure of federal
funds.147 The plurality also noted the Court’s longstanding policy
against finding standing where the alleged injury is a “generalized

140. Id. at 995-96. The Seventh Circuit gave the example of the President making a religious
reference in the State of the Union Address. Id. In that case, the expenses involved in providing
security for the President would be considered incidental to the performance of his function of
delivering the speech. Id. Even if it were assumed that such statements violated the Establishment
Clause, such expenditures could not be the basis for taxpayer standing to challenge the expenses
associated with the speech because those expenses would be incurred even if the speech contained
no religious references. Id.
141. Id. at 996-97.
142. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 722 (2006) (granting petition
for writ of certiorari).
143. Brief for the Petitioners at *I, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2553 (No. 06-157) (Jan. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 62299.
144. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007). Justice Alito
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 2559.
145. Id. at 2562-63.
146. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
147. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2562.
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grievance[]” shared “in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.”148
The plurality recognized the continued validity of the exception
provided in Flast and applied the Flast test.149 The plurality found that
the Plaintiffs failed to establish “the requisite ‘logical nexus’ between
taxpayer status ‘and the type of legislative enactment attacked.’”150 The
plurality reasoned that the expenditures related to the challenged
activities fell outside the Flast exception because they were not made
pursuant to an express congressional mandate.151
The plurality
determined the challenged expenditures were the product of executive
discretion and not a congressional act.152 The plurality similarly rejected
the Plaintiffs’ argument that the challenge was an as-applied challenge to
the underlying congressional appropriation because the Plaintiffs were
unable to identify any specific statute authorizing the challenged
expenditure.153
The plurality believed that Flast should not be expanded to include
the instant case because it would shift the equilibrium of powers away
from the democratically elected branches and transform the courts into
“forums for taxpayers’ generalized grievances.”154 The plurality rejected
the Court of Appeals incremental cost test as being unworkable.155 The
plurality, who were joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas in concurring
in the judgment, reversed the Seventh Circuit.156
2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote separately, emphasizing separation-ofpowers concerns and noting the importance of public events and
speeches in facilitating an open discussion to address governmental

148. Id. at 2564 n.2 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174 (1974), and
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006)).
149. Id. at 2565-68.
150. Id. at 2568 (citing Flast, 392 U.S. at 102).
151. Id. at 2568. The plurality found that the Plaintiffs fell outside the Flast exception because
they failed to direct their complaint at a specific congressional enactment. Id.
152. Id. at 2566.
153. Id. at 2567.
154. Id. at 2570.
155. Id. The plurality criticized the Seventh Circuit’s zero incremental cost test as giving
taxpayers standing to potentially challenge many speeches by Executive Branch personnel. Id. The
plurality gave the examples of an Executive Branch official attending a prayer breakfast or a
speechwriter researching religious imagery as potentially giving rise to taxpayer standing in cases
where standing was not warranted. Id. at 2570-71.
156. Id. at 2570.
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concerns.157 Justice Kennedy feared that applying the Flast exception to
executive speeches and conferences would result in “judicial oversight
of executive duties.”158 Justice Kennedy further noted that the lack of
judicial intervention in the activities of the Legislative and Executive
Branches did not excuse the members of those branches from complying
with the Constitution.159
3. Justice Scalia’s Opinion Concurring in the Judgment160
Justice Scalia criticized the distinction that the plurality drew
between the facts in the case before the Court and those in Flast.161
Instead, Justice Scalia rejected the allowance for taxpayer standing
provided in Flast, finding Flast “wholly irreconcilable with . . . Article
III restrictions on federal-court jurisdiction . . . .”162 He contended that
the two-prong test established in Flast was a contrivance used by the
Court in Flast to prevent its holding from being inconsistent with earlier
precedent.163 In criticizing the Court’s “shameful tradition” in deciding
taxpayer-standing cases, Justice Scalia noted the Court’s unwillingness
to recognize Flast’s reliance on psychic injury.164
Justice Scalia reasoned that the Court should first address Flast
head-on and either apply Flast to the limits of its logic or reject its logic
and overrule it.165 He then asserted that simply satisfying the Flast
criteria was not sufficient to establish an injury under Article III because
the alleged psychological injury was not sufficiently concrete or
particularized.166 Justice Scalia further criticized the Flast opinion for
157. Id. at 2572-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
158. Id. at 2573. Justice Kennedy cautioned that by permitting courts to review the content of
executive officials’ public speeches, “courts would soon assume the role of speech editors for
communications issued by executive officials and event planners for meetings they hold.” Id.
159. Id. (“Government officials must make a conscious decision to obey the Constitution
whether or not their acts can be challenged in a court of law . . . .”).
160. Id. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia delivered an opinion joined
by Justice Thomas concurring in judgment only. Id.
161. Id. Justice Scalia describes the plurality’s opinion as “creat[ing] . . . [a] meaningless
distinction[]” that cannot justify a different result “in any sane world.” Id.
162. Id. at 2574.
163. Id. at 2575.
164. Id. at 2578-80.
165. Id. at 2582.
166. Id. at 2582-83. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia identifies two types of injury asserted by
taxpayers: “Wallet Injury” and “Psychic Injury.” Id. at 2574. “Wallet Injury” is the taxpayer’s
alleged higher tax liability as a result of the unlawful expenditures and “Psychic Injury” is the
“mental displeasure” resulting from the use of tax money in violation of the law. Id. Justice Scalia
argues that neither of these injuries is sufficient to support taxpayer standing. Id. at 2574-75. He
quickly dismisses “Wallet Injury” as suitable to support standing because the “Wallet Injury” is
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failing to recognize the standing rules’ separation-of-powers function.167
Justice Scalia saw no value in applying stare decisis principles to uphold
Flast, noting that the Court’s rulings on Article III standing have been so
erratic that no person would reasonably rely on Flast’s holding.168
Justice Scalia concluded that Flast should be overruled.169
4. Dissenting Opinion170
The dissent claimed that the government’s spending of money for
religious purposes is itself a judicially cognizable injury.171 The dissent,
like Justice Scalia, disagreed with the plurality’s creation of a distinction
between congressionally earmarked funds and Executive Branch
discretionary funds.172 The dissent noted that an injury shared with the
public generally should not deprive a plaintiff of standing.173 The
dissenting justices asserted that no extension of Flast was required and
that the taxpayers in this case had shown a cognizable injury under
Flast.174 The dissent believed the expenditure of tax funds by the
executive in identifiable sums under a general appropriation satisfied
Flast’s link between taxpayer status and a congressional enactment.175

neither sufficiently traceable to the government’s alleged wrongdoing nor capable of redress by the
courts. Id. at 2574. The absence of traceability and redressability are due to the uncertain effect
that the alleged wrongful conduct and the requested relief would have on the taxpayer’s tax liability.
Id. Justice Scalia then focuses on why “Psychic Injury” is insufficient for taxpayer standing.
167. Id. at 2583. Justice Scalia found “Psychic Injury” to be “a contradiction of the basic
propositions that the function of the judicial power ‘is solely, to decide the rights of individuals.’”
Id. at 2584 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). He believed the Flast test failed to
demonstrate that the “Psychic Injury” purportedly suffered by the taxpayer plaintiff was any
different than the injury suffered by the general public. Id. at 2583.
168. Id. at 2584.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 2587 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Id.
171. Id. at 2587.
172. Id. at 2586. “[T]he plurality’s distinction between a ‘congressional mandate’ on one hand
and ‘executive discretion’ on the other is at once arbitrary and hard to manage.” Id. (citation
omitted). “When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes,
no less than when Congress authorizes the same thing, the taxpayers suffer injury.” Id. at 2585.
173. Id. at 2587 n.3.
174. Id. at 2585.
175. See id. at 2585-86.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Flast Test
To understand the impact of Hein, one must first fully understand
the two-pronged test articulated in Flast.176 Unfortunately, in deciding
taxpayer standing cases, the Court has not always been clear in
explaining what distinguished the taxpayer plaintiffs with standing from
those without standing.177 Furthermore, the Court’s attempts to
articulate why the distinctions the test drew between different plaintiffs
were relevant to the standing inquiry have not been completely
satisfying.178 However, an examination of the Flast decision and its
progeny do lend some insight into how the test functions and what
purpose it serves.
Each of the three elements of federal-taxpayer standing may be
seen as limiting the population of suits that may be heard by the federal
judiciary.179 The requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete injury
generally has the effect of narrowing the population of potential
plaintiffs who may bring a suit to challenge an action.180 When the
government acts in violation of the law, arguably all citizens are injured
because each citizen has an interest in having the government comply
with the laws.181 The Court’s prohibition on hearing “generalized
grievances” reflects the Court’s determination that in those cases where
the population of plaintiffs includes all citizens, the redress of the
grievance is best left to political processes.182 The Flast test is best

176. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
177. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2574 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“We have inconsistently
described the first element of the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing’ . . . .”); Valley
Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475
(1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been
defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court which have
discussed it . . . .”).
178. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4 at 691 (describing the distinctions drawn by the Valley
Forge Court as “senseless”); Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2573 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(describing the distinctions drawn as “utterly meaningless”).
179. See supra note 24.
180. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755-56 (1984).
181. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
182. Id. (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance
about government - claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it
does the public at large - does not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
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viewed as separating these “generalized grievance” cases from those
cases where a taxpayer is alleging a more particularized injury.183
According to the Flast Court, the test was created to require a
plaintiff claiming injury as a taxpayer to show that the alleged injury was
in fact suffered in his or her capacity as a taxpayer.184 Specifically, the
test was designed to determine if the source of the plaintiff’s alleged
injury was the result of an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing
and spending power.185 The primary distinction that the Flast Court
sought to draw was not based on the magnitude of the injury allegedly
suffered by the plaintiff, but rather the type of the injury suffered.186
Thus, the Flast Court apparently intended to separate plaintiffs truly
asserting taxpayer standing from those asserting “citizen standing”187 by
recognizing that a taxpayer is not just complaining about the government
acting contrary to the Constitution, but is in fact complaining about an
injury greater than that suffered by the public at large, namely the taking
and use of his or her money for an unlawful purpose.188 The manner in
which the Flast test accomplishes this distinction can be seen by
examining each of its elements.
1. Flast’s First Prong – The Taxpayer-Tax Power Nexus
The Flast test seeks to accomplish the separation of the taxpayer
plaintiff from the citizen plaintiff by first requiring the plaintiff to first
show a logical link between the plaintiff’s status as taxpayer and the type
of enactment challenged.189 Thus, to satisfy Flast’s first prong, a
plaintiff must show (1) that he or she is a federal taxpayer and (2) that
the challenged act is an exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending
power.190 This first prong requirement separates the taxpayer from the
183. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101-03 (1968).
184. Id. at 102 (stating the test determines “whether there is a logical nexus between the status
asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated”).
185. Id.
186. See id. at 101-03. The Flast Court focused the inquiry on plaintiff’s status and the nature
of the congressional enactment. Id. There is no evaluation made of the amount of tax paid by the
taxpayer in support of the alleged unconstitutional expenditure. Id.
187. As used in this discussion, “citizen standing” refers to the assertion of standing resting on
the premise that each citizen of the country has an interest in seeing the government act in
accordance with the Constitution. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 216-17 (1974).
188. Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (distinguishing the judicially redressable injury of the Flast
plaintiffs from the generalized grievance of the plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923)).
189. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102.
190. Id.
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mere citizen in two ways. To illustrate how these modes of separation
work, let us consider two hypothetical situations where the plaintiff
would not have standing. In the first case, a non-taxpaying citizen sues
alleging a congressional act exceeds Congress’s taxing and spending
authority.191 In the second case, a taxpaying plaintiff sues alleging that a
congressional exercise of one of Congress’s other powers violates the
constitution.192
a. The Need for a Taxpayer
The non-taxpaying citizen in the first example fails Flast’s first
prong because he simply has no status other than that of citizen to assert
claims that can be tied to the exercise of the taxing and spending
power.193 In effect, the non-taxpaying plaintiff is incapable of suffering
any particularized injury by the congressional exercise of the taxing and
spending power alone because he has had no money taken from him that
could be spent in violation of the Constitution.194 Since any injury that
the non-taxpayer plaintiff suffered as a citizen would necessarily have
been suffered by taxpaying and non-taxpaying citizens alike, it is one of
the “generalized grievances” shared by all citizens that the Court has
consistently rejected as the basis for standing.195
b. An Exercise of the Taxing and Spending Power
In the second hypothetical, the taxpaying plaintiff would fail
because he was not challenging an exercise of the taxing and spending
power.196 In this case, the taxpaying plaintiff can suffer no greater injury
191. In reality, a court would never actually apply the Flast test in this case because there is no
“taxpayer standing” question since there is no taxpayer, but the hypothetical application of Flast to
this case can help in understanding the purpose that the test serves.
192. Unlike the first hypothetical, the Supreme Court has addressed cases where the taxpayer
plaintiff was not challenging the congressional exercise of the taxing and spending power. See infra
note 196 (cataloguing these cases).
193. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 101 (“[The rules of standing] have been fashioned with specific
reference to the status asserted by the party whose standing is challenged and the type of question he
wishes to have adjudicated.”).
194. See id. at 106 (“The taxpayer’s allegation . . . would be that his tax money is being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections . . . .”).
195. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992) (“We have consistently
held that a plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government - claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large - does
not state an Article III case or controversy.”).
196. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168 (denying standing to a taxpayer
challenging congressional compliance with the Statement and Accounts Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
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than the non-taxpaying plaintiff by the unconstitutional act because the
source of his injury is not the result of the taking and spending of his
money.197 Without any greater injury than that suffered by the nontaxpaying plaintiff, the plaintiff’s complaint in the second case also
becomes a “generalized grievance” shared by all citizens.198 In applying
Flast’s first prong, the Court has found on several occasions that the
action challenged by the taxpayer was not an exercise of Congress’s
taxing and spending power and rightly denied standing based on the lack
of any injury other than a generalized grievance that the government is
acting unconstitutionally.199
c. Expenditures Incidental to Regulatory Programs
In setting forth the first prong of the test, the Flast Court stated that
it would be insufficient for a plaintiff asserting standing to allege only
“an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an
essentially regulatory statute.”200 It is more difficult to see how this
requirement advances the first prong’s purpose of differentiating the
taxpayer’s injury from the citizen’s general grievance.201 However, this

§ 9, cl. 7); Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (denying
standing to taxpayers challenging compliance with the Incompatibility Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, §
6, cl. 2); Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 479-80 (1982) (denying standing to taxpayers challenging an exercise of executive
action authorized by Congress under the Property Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
197. See, e.g., Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 212-29 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim for taxpayer standing
where their asserted injury – deprivation of the services of a Congressman who is in the military
Reserves – is unrelated to Congress’s taxing and spending power, affecting taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike).
198. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175-77 (recognizing the interest of a taxpayer in knowing
how his taxes are spent, but holding that any injury the plaintiff may have suffered from Congress’s
alleged violation of the Statement and Accounts Clause was undifferentiated from the public at
large).
199. See supra note 196.
200. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
201. The Flast Court apparently included this requirement in order to distinguish the Flast
plaintiffs from the group of plaintiffs who were denied standing in Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342
U.S. 429 (1952). Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. However, the Flast Court did not actually define what
constitutes either “an incidental expenditure” or “an essentially regulatory statute.” See id. The
Supreme Court has never directly stated what is and is not an “incidental expenditure.” The Courts
of Appeals have attempted to interpret the “incidental expenditure.” Compare Doe v. Madison Sch.
Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 796 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (defining “an incidental expenditure” as
the “type of indirect support that flows to an activity when the government does not spend ‘a
measurable appropriation or disbursement’ solely on the challenged activity”) with Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 995 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (describing incidental expenditures as those
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requirement does in fact help differentiate the taxpayer’s complaint from
the citizen’s grievance by focusing the standing inquiry on whether the
challenged action is actually an exercise of the taxing and spending
power or if the plaintiff’s claim is really just a disguised challenge to the
exercise of one of Congress’s regulatory powers.202 If the true source of
the challenged action is an exercise of a regulatory power then the
taxpayer is in the same position as the non-taxpaying citizen.203
The incidental expenditure element also serves a practical function.
In the case of a plaintiff whose complaint is truly targeted at an abuse of
a regulatory power, there is more likely to be a plaintiff who is directly
impacted by the exercise of a regulatory power.204 In such cases, a court
might believe that the target of the regulation is a “better” party to bring
the suit.205 In the case of an act involving purely an expenditure of tax
funds without any accompanying regulation, there is less likely a party
on the spending side of the enactment who could legitimately claim
where the action which the plaintiff complains has a “marginal or incremental cost to the taxpaying
public”).
202. The way in which the “incidental expenditure” requirement differentiates valid taxpayer
complaints from citizens’ generalized grievances becomes apparent when examined in light of the
three underlying elements of plaintiff standing: (1) a “concrete and particularized” injury (2) that is
“fairly traceable” to the challenged action and (3) likely to be redressed by a favorable court
decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The unlawful exercise of a
purely regulatory power (i.e., one involving no expenditure of funds) would not injure the taxpaying
citizen any more than the non-taxpaying citizen because there is no monetary injury to elevate the
taxpayer’s claim to anything more than a generalized grievance shared by all citizens. See supra
Parts IV(A)(1)(a)-(b). Therefore, the plaintiff must allege at least the expenditure of tax funds to
show a sufficiently concrete injury. The need for plaintiffs to show that the expenditure is more
than merely incidental to a regulatory statute supports the requirements that the injury be “fairly
traceable” to the defendant’s conduct and redressable by the courts. If the challenged activity were
merely the expenditure of funds incidental to a regulatory program, there would be great uncertainty
as to whether the challenged activity had any impact on the plaintiff’s tax burden. Thus, any
monetary injury suffered by the taxpayer would not be fairly traceable to expenditures incidental to
the challenged activity. Since the cause of plaintiff’s alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the
activity, there is similar doubt that the court’s remedy would be effective at redressing the plaintiff’s
monetary injury.
203. See supra Part IV(A)(1)(b).
204. For example, although the plaintiffs in Doremus v. Board of Education lacked standing as
taxpayers to challenge the reading of Bible verses in schools because they could not show that any
tax funds were spent in furtherance of the regulation, a student at the school who alleged being
directly injured by the reading of the Bible in class would have standing to challenge the regulation.
See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432 (1952).
205. David S. Bogen, Standing Up for Flast: Taxpayer and Citizen Standing to Raise
Constitutional Issues, 67 KY. L.J. 147, 170-71 (1978-79); John J. Egan, III, Note, Analyzing
Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General Standing Principles: The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REV.
717, 739 n.105 (1983) (“[T]hose directly affected by an essentially regulatory statute can bring suit
and that there is consequently no need to extend standing to taxpayers who are affected only
indirectly.”).
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direct injury.206 In such a case, a taxpayer would be a better party than a
mere citizen because the taxpayer suffered a financial injury whereas all
other citizens would only have a generalized grievance shared by all.207
2. Flast’s Second Prong – A Constitutional Limitation on the
Taxing and Spending Power
Flast’s second prong requires “a nexus between [the plaintiff’s
taxpayer status] and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged.”208 To establish this nexus, a plaintiff must show that the
challenged act violates a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing
and spending power.209 This second prong also acts to differentiate
between the injured taxpayer and the aggrieved citizen.210 It does so by
assuring that the source of the plaintiff’s injury is from the expenditure
of funds itself and not merely the process by which the funds were
spent.211 The second prong thus assures that the challenged action
involves an alleged violation of a constitutional provision designed to
protect taxpayers.212 By requiring a showing that the source of the injury
is the expenditure of funds, the second prong assures that the plaintiff’s
assertion of unlawful expenditure of funds is not merely a pretext for

206. Bogen, supra note 205, at 170-71.
207. See id.
208. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
209. Id. at 102-03. The Establishment Clause is the only specific limitation on the taxing and
spending power that the Supreme Court has recognized as satisfying Flast’s second prong. 13A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3531.10 (2007). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized the two-year limit on
congressional appropriations for use to raise and support an army as a specific limitation on the
spending power. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12 (“ [B]ut no Appropriation of Money to that Use
shall be for a longer Term than two years”); See Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618,
633 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding the clause a specific limitation on congressional spending, but
dismissing the claim on other grounds).
210. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 (distinguishing the judicially redressable injury of the Flast
plaintiffs from the generalized grievance of the plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923)).
211. Flast’s second prong assures the plaintiff’s injury is more than just a claim that political
procedures were not followed by requiring the alleged act violate a “[l]imitation[] on the exercise of
power, as opposed to [a] limitation[] on who can appropriately exercise it . . . .” Bogen, supra note
205, at 171. Since all citizens have an interest in Congress only exercising its delegated powers, the
injury resulting from Congress overstepping its bounds is a generalized grievance shared by all. See
id.
212. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY 1888-1986 at 444 (1990).
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challenging the unlawful exercise of another one of Congress’s
powers.213
B. Drawing a New Line
An examination of the plurality’s application of the Flast test in
Hein reveals that the Court added a new distinction between plaintiffs
that is inconsistent with the test’s purpose of differentiating the taxpayer
plaintiff from the aggrieved citizen. In reaching its decision, the Hein
plurality relies heavily upon the fact that the expenditures were made
from general appropriations and were not traceable to a specific,
earmarked congressional appropriation214 to conclude that the first prong
of the Flast test was not satisfied.215 However, the distinction between
expenditures of earmarked funds and expenditures of generally
appropriated funds does not clearly affect the concreteness of the
plaintiff’s injury,216 nor does it clearly affect the logical nexus between
the plaintiff’s status as taxpayer and the type of action challenged so as
to leave the complaining taxpayer undifferentiated from the aggrieved
citizen.217

213. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 104-05. The Flast Court in distinguishing Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923), stated that the Frothingham plaintiff was asserting a state’s interest in freely
exercising its legislative authority rather than her interest as a taxpayer. Flast, 392 U.S. at 104-05.
The second prong thus gives the Court additional assurance that the complaint is not a generalized
grievance. Id. at 106.
214. To understand the analysis that follows, it is important to have a basic understanding of
the difference between general appropriations and earmarked appropriations. Congress passes bills
that appropriate money for use by the Executive Branch to execute the laws. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-261SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATION LAW 1-2 (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/3rdeditionvol1.pdf. Some of these bills have
provisions that appropriate specific amounts and restrict the use of those funds for a specified
purpose. Id. at 2-21. Such an appropriation is referred to as an “earmark.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-2.1.1, A GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET
PROCESS 43 (1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/148403.pdf. Congress also
appropriates funds for general use by Executive Branch offices. GAO-04-261SP at 2-21. Congress
does not specifically restrict how these funds may be used. Id. These appropriations are “general
appropriations” and are provided to give the office the funding sufficient to carry out its statutory
purpose. Id. at 4-09 to 4-11.
215. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2568 (2007).
216. To borrow Justice Scalia’s terminology, the “Wallet Injury” and “Psychic Injury” are no
different for an expenditure of earmarked funds as for an expenditure of generally appropriated
funds. See supra note 166. The money is still being taken from the taxpayer and spent in an
allegedly unconstitutional manner, so the financial “Wallet Injury” is no different. See Hein, 127 S.
Ct. at 2580 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Similarly, the “Psychic Injury” of the mental
displeasure the plaintiffs feel in having tax money spent in violation of the Establishment Clause
can hardly be based on the form of the appropriations bill. See id.
217. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
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1. Executive vs. Congressional Action
One justification the plurality provides for the earmarked versus
general appropriation distinction is that expenditures of general
appropriations are directed by the President rather than Congress.218 The
President undoubtedly has the power to execute the laws of the United
States, including the power to spend moneys appropriated by Congress
within the limits of the law.219 In the same way that plaintiffs who had
previously successfully established standing under the Flast test, the
Hein plaintiffs brought suit against Executive Branch officials.220
Therefore, the person or organization spending the appropriated funds
cannot itself be a meaningful difference in the standing inquiry.221 Of
course, there is arguably a difference in who is directing the expenditure
of the funds. In the case of an earmarked appropriation, the executive
official has less discretion in directing the funds since he must spend
them for the identified purpose, whereas in the case of a general
appropriation, the executive has greater discretion in directing use of the
funds.222 But is this distinction meaningful for the standing inquiry? As
the Hein dissent aptly noted, the mere exercise of executive discretion
cannot alone deprive a plaintiff of standing since the Court had
previously held in Bowen v. Kendrick that plaintiffs had standing to
challenge a facially valid appropriation statute as applied to grants made
pursuant to Executive Branch discretion.223
The only apparent
difference between Bowen v. Kendrick and Hein then becomes the
distinction between an appropriation bill that explicitly permits
executive discretion in funding activities that may violate the
Constitution versus a general appropriation bill that does not specifically
218. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568.
219. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”).
220. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (suit against the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare, et. al); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (suit against the Secretary of Health and
Human Services); Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2553 (suit against the Director of White House Office of
Faith-Based and Community Issues, et. al.).
221. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103 (finding standing to challenge the expenditure by the Executive
Branch); Bowen, 487 U.S. at 620 (finding standing to challenge grants directed by the Executive
Branch); Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571-72 (finding no standing to challenge the expenditure by the
Executive Branch).
222. The Executive Branch may not spend money for a purpose other than that authorized by
law. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law”). The statutory language defines what is authorized
by law. GAO-04-261SP, supra note 214, at 4-9.
223. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2586 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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state that funds may be used for a specific program that may violate the
Constitution.224 However, it is not clear how this difference is
meaningful when evaluating the appropriation under Flast.
2. Earmarked vs. General Appropriations – A Meaningless
Distinction?225
The plurality states that to treat a general appropriation bill in the
same manner as a specific appropriation bill “would stretch the meaning
of [‘as-applied challenge’] past its breaking point,” and would establish
standing to challenge the underlying appropriation in any case where a
discretionary executive action is challenged.226 The plurality relies on
this fear of opening the door to challenges of all discretionary actions to
exclude Executive Branch-directed expenditures under Flast’s first
prong requirement that the challenged act be an exercise of the taxing
and spending power.227 However, this fear is unwarranted. The
plurality ignores the fact that Flast requires more than simply a
challenge to the taxing and spending power and that the “incidental
expenditure” element of Flast’s first prong and Flast’s second prong
would act to deny taxpayers standing in many of the challenges to
executive action that the plurality fears.228 In fact, these are specifically
the types of generalized grievances that the “incidental expenditure”
requirement and the second prong were designed to weed out.229 By
denying any taxpayer plaintiff standing to challenge any executivedirected expenditures of general appropriation, the plurality paints with a
224. Compare id. at 2568, with Bowen, 487 U.S. at 593-94.
225. Justice Scalia uses the term “meaningless distinction” to describe the plurality’s
distinction between earmarked and general appropriations. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2584 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
226. Id. at 2567-68 (plurality opinion).
227. Id. at 2568 (“Because the expenditures that respondents challenge were not expressly
authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment, respondents’ lawsuit is not
directed at an exercise of congressional power and thus lacks the requisite ‘logical nexus’ between
taxpayer status ‘and the type of legislative enactment attacked.’”) (citations omitted).
228. See id. at 2567-68 (omitting a discussion of the “incidental expenditure” element);
Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 995-96 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d sub
nom. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (arguing that the
“incidental expenditure” element forecloses attenuated claims against the executive, such as
mentioning religion in a speech).
229. The “incidental expenditure” requirement was set up to exclude taxpayer standing to
challenge regulatory programs such as the school prayer regulation challenged in Doremus v. Board
of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968). The second prong
was designed to deny taxpayer plaintiffs standing in cases such as Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923), where the constitutional limit alleged to be violated was not a provision designed to
specifically protect the interests of taxpayers. Flast, 392 U.S. at 104-05.
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broader brush than is necessary to effectively differentiate the valid
taxpayer claim from the generalized grievance.
To illustrate their fear of opening the door to challenges of all
executive actions, the plurality provides an example that if challenges to
general appropriations were permitted then a criminal defendant could
challenge an unconstitutional search or seizure as a taxpayer challenging
the appropriation statute for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.230 To
be sure, a criminal defendant under the Court’s precedents would not
have standing as a taxpayer to challenge the constitutionality of an FBI
search or seizure. However, the defendant’s lack of standing as a
taxpayer in this example is not because the general appropriation bill is
not challengeable as an exercise of the taxing and spending power.231
Nor is the defendant’s lack of standing due to the fact that the money
spent in conducting the search was at the direction of the Executive
Branch rather than by congressional earmark.232 Rather, the taxpayerdefendant would fail Flast’s requirement that the expenditure not be
incidental to a regulatory statute as well as Flast’s second prong because
the Fourth Amendment is not a “specific constitutional limitation[]
imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending
power.”233 Thus, Flast already contained provisions that would greatly

230. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568. Usually, a criminal defendant would have standing to challenge
the search as the direct victim of the search or seizure because he or she would have alleged an
undoubtedly concrete injury to his or her liberty or privacy interests and would not need to assert
standing as a taxpayer. E.g. Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2402 (2007) (holding
passenger in car seized as a result of unlawful traffic stop had standing to challenge stop).
However, we must assume for the discussion of this example that the defendant is challenging the
search or seizure of another person, which he would not have standing to challenge except as a
taxpayer.
231. The Flast first prong requires (1) the challenged act be an exercise of Congress’s taxing
and spending power and (2) that the challenged expenditure not be merely incidental to an
essentially regulatory statute. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. See also supra Part IV(A)(1). Since the
challenged act in this hypothetical would be the appropriations bill, which is necessarily an exercise
of the taxing and spending power, the first sub-element is satisfied.
232. See Bowen v. Kendrick 487 U.S. 589, 619 (1988) (rejecting the government’s contention
that money spent at direction of the Executive Branch was not an “exercise of congressional
authority under the Taxing and Spending Clause.”).
233. Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03. This hypothetical illustrates why the Flast Court imposed the
“incidental expenditure” requirement. The defendant in this hypothetical is in the same position as
the plaintiffs in Doremus v. Board of Education because the defendant would be unable to show that
the amount expended to perform the unlawful search would be any different than the alternative,
constitutional law enforcement action. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434-35. Also,
the victim of the search would be a better plaintiff than a mere taxpayer since the injury suffered to
the victim’s interest in being free of unreasonable searches and seizures would be more concrete
than any interest asserted by a mere taxpayer. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text. As
to the second prong, “the basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy
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limit challenges to the discretionary executive activities that the plurality
seemed to fear. The new line the plurality draws between general and
earmarked appropriations blurs the elements of the Flast test by
incorporating a new restriction into the taxpayer-tax power nexus
requirement that overlaps the functions of the incidental expenditure
requirement and second prong but which is much broader in limiting
which exercises of the taxing and spending power are challengeable.234
The plurality’s blurring of the Flast test’s elements is also evident
in how they support the assertion that Flast has not been extended
beyond the Establishment Clause.235 The plurality notes that the Court
has not extended taxpayer standing to sue under the Statement and
Account Clause236 in United States v. Richardson237 or the
Incompatibility Clause238 in Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War.239
However, neither of these cases should be relied upon as supporting the
proposition that those provisions are not constitutional limitations on
Congress’s taxing and spending power. In those cases, the Court held
that the plaintiffs failed Flast’s first prong because they were not

and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,” not to protect
taxpayers from unlawful expenditures of governmental funds. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). Thus the Fourth Amendment would not be a
specific constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power. See supra Part IV(A)(2).
234. The most notable cases that the distinction between executive discretion and
congressional expenditure would leave unchallengeable would be ones such as Executive Branchdirected programs that provide grants to support religious organization for religious purposes, or
Executive Branch programs established solely for the purpose of promoting religion.
235. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2569 (“We have declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits
alleging violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause”).
236. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“[A] regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”).
237. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
238. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
239. 418 U.S 208 (1974); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2569 (2007). In addition to Richardson and Schlesinger, the plurality also cites Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), as supporting “no taxpayer standing to sue under the Free
Exercise Clause,” and DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) as supporting “no
taxpayer standing under the Commerce Clause.” Id. The Court in Tilton did not apply the Flast test
and, in fact, did not rule on the issue of the plaintiffs’ standing. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 689. The
Tilton Court evaluated the challenged statute on the merits and did not determine if the Free
Exercise Clause could be a constitutional limitation that satisfies Flast’s second prong. Id.
(“Appellants claim that the Free Exercise Clause is violated because they are compelled to pay
taxes, the proceeds of which in part finance grants under the Act. Appellants, however, are unable
to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs.”).
DaimlerChrysler, in applying a Flast-like analysis to state expenditures, did hold that the
Commerce Clause was not a specific constitutional limitation on state taxing and spending power
under Flast’s second prong. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 347-49.
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challenging the exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power.240
The plurality reads Richardson and Schlesinger as largely confining
Flast to its facts.241 This overstates the importance of Richardson and
Schlesinger, which certainly call for rigorous application of Flast’s
requirement for a challenge to the taxing and spending power but cannot
be read as a narrowing of the Flast holding.242
By distinguishing between general appropriation bills and specific
appropriations that allow executive discretion, the plurality is narrowing
the Flast exception by introducing a new element to the first prong
requirement for a challenge to the taxing and spending power that did
not previously exist.243 The plurality’s concern about allowing taxpayer
standing to challenge all executive actions is legitimate and supported by
separation-of-powers concerns that have been expressed in earlier
decisions.244 However, by drawing the line between congressionally
mandated and discretionary executive actions, the plurality would deny
standing to a greater number of potential plaintiffs than necessary to
address their concern, including a large number of cases where the
separation-of-powers concerns are no greater than in a challenge to
congressionally mandated expenditures.245
Even accepting the
plurality’s contention that the incremental expenditure test proposed by
the Seventh Circuit is unworkable, a rule could have been set forth that
would at least have given taxpayers standing to challenge programs that

240. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (“Respondent makes no claim that
appropriated funds are being spent in violation of ‘a specific constitutional limitation upon the . . .
taxing and spending power . . . .’”) (quoting Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83, 104); Schlesinger v.
Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974) (finding that plaintiffs did not challenge a
congressional action under Art. I § 8).
241. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568-69.
242. Neither Richardson nor Schlesinger required any narrowing of the Flast holding in order
to deny those plaintiffs standing because in both cases the plaintiffs failed to challenge an exercise
of the taxing and spending power. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 175; Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 228.
243. It is noted that the plurality did not determine that the Plaintiffs’ challenged action was
“an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute.”
Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102). Rather, the plurality rested its
determination that the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the first prong on the distinction between Executive
Branch directed expenditures and congressional directed expenditures. Id. By doing so, the
plurality changed the analysis of the incidental expenditure element from an evaluation of whether
the challenged act is regulatory in nature as opposed to a disbursement program to an evaluation of
which branch is directing a challenged expenditure.
244. Id. at 2570 (noting that allowing standing to challenge all Executive Branch discretionary
actions could result in excessive judicial intervention in the executive function).
245. Id. at 2586 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no difference on [the separation of power
concern] between a Judicial Branch review of an executive decision and a judicial evaluation of a
congressional one.”).
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are at their heart spending programs.246 Such a rule would largely
address the plurality’s separation-of-powers concerns but would also
remain true to the Flast holding by preserving the distinction between
taxpayer complaint and citizen grievance.247 As the Court noted in
Bowen v. Kendrick, the flow of funds through the executive simply does
not make the challenged act any less of an exercise of the taxing and
spending power.248
C. Practical Impact of Hein
The Court’s decision in Hein will have consequences for plaintiffs
in future lawsuits and could affect the possible form of future
congressional appropriations.
1. Effect on Future Plaintiffs
The most direct impact of the Court’s decision in Hein will likely
be taxpayer plaintiffs having even greater difficulty establishing standing
in federal courts.249 Although the Court’s earlier Flast applications had
strictly limited taxpayer plaintiff standing to challenges of exercises of
the taxing and spending power, Hein now adds the new requirement of
showing that it is Congress who is directing the spending.250 This will
make the already difficult-to-pass Flast test even more difficult.251
There will simply be no judicial remedy available when the Executive

246. The plurality could have broadened the “incidental expenditure” requirement to extend
beyond “regulatory programs” to include those activities for which it expressed concern, such as
speech preparation and conference attendance, since such activities would generally not produce a
concrete injury to the taxpayer that is fairly traceable to the Executive Branch action. See id. at
2571 (2007); see also supra note 202.
247. See supra Part IV(A).
248. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619 (1988).
249. Hein’s restriction on challenges to discretionary acts has already been used to deny
plaintiffs standing as taxpayers. E.g. Hinrichs v. Speaker of the House of Representatives of the
Ind. General Assembly, 506 F.3d 584, 598-600 (7th Cir. 2007) (relying on Hein to deny plaintiffs
standing to challenge use of funds in support of an Indiana General Assembly prayer program on
grounds that there was no specific appropriation for the program); In re Navy Chaplaincy, 516 F.
Supp. 2d 119, 126-27 (D.D.C. 2007) (relying on Hein to deny standing as taxpayers to plaintiffs
challenging the administration of the Navy chaplaincy program on grounds that no specific
congressional appropriation was challenged).
250. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568.
251. Staudt, supra note 27, at 810 (noting general hostility to federal taxpayer standing in
federal courts). See also supra note 249.
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Branch spends treasury funds in violation of the Establishment Clause
unless such spending creates a more directly injured plaintiff.252
2. Congressional Appropriations Legislation
Hein opens the door for Congress and the President to potentially
act cooperatively to violate the Establishment Clause as well as other
possible constitutional limitations on the taxing and spending power
without the possibility of judicial intervention.253 If the President
initiated a program by executive order that clearly violated the
Establishment Clause and funded it through generally appropriated
funds, then as long as no party suffered a direct injury as a result of the
program there would be no person - citizen or taxpayer - with standing
to challenge the program.254 A congressional majority that is either
friendly to the President or that supports his cause could endorse the
program by simply adjusting the general appropriation for the office
upward.255 Of course, there is also the possibility that Congress could
either reduce the discretionary funding for the office or include specific
provisions in the appropriations bill forbidding the use of funds for the
program.256 Thus, in such cases, taxpayers will have to rely exclusively
on political processes to vindicate their right not to have their tax dollars
“extracted and spent in violation of [the Establishment Clause].”257
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the plurality’s assertion that it left Flast unchanged,258
the Supreme Court’s decision in Hein redraws the boundaries of the
252. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571. A direct injury would require a plaintiff to at least observe
“offensive religious materials” where the plaintiff has a “personal connection” with the conduct
alleged to violate the Establishment Clause. Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1066,
1073 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
253. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (holding that expenditures not expressly authorized or
mandated by Congress do not give rise to taxpayer standing).
254. Id. Similarly, any congressionally enacted program that was invalidated by the courts
could subsequently be made immune to challenge if adopted by the executive and supported by
general congressional appropriation. See id.
255. Such an action would be unchallengeable by taxpayers because there would be no express
congressional mandate on how the funds are spent. Id. at 2568.
256. See id. at 2571 (“In the unlikely event that any [clearly unacceptable executive actions]
did take place, Congress could quickly step in.”). The bill reducing the appropriation or restricting
the use of the funds would also need to be presented to the President for approval. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7, cl. 2. Since appropriations for most programs are passed as part of omnibus bills, any
decision to defund a program would likely be subject to compromise.
257. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 (1968).
258. Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2572.
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taxpayer-standing test developed in Flast v. Cohen.259 Thus, instead of
bringing clarity to a muddy area of law, the plurality continues the
Court’s tradition of being less than completely forthright in its taxpayer
standing decisions.260 The plurality’s introduction of the earmarkedgeneral appropriation distinction into the first prong of the Flast test is
not supported by the Court’s precedent and creates a higher hurdle for
taxpayer plaintiffs to clear than is necessary to address the separation-ofpowers concerns that the plurality raised.261 By drawing a line based on
who is spending the money rather than how the money is being spent,
the plurality undermines the Flast test’s connection to the three
underlying essentials of Article III standing.262 The concreteness and
particularity of a taxpayer’s alleged injury is unaffected by whether the
money is spent as a result of a congressional earmark or a discretionary
executive expenditure.263 Similarly, which governmental branch directs
the expenditure of funds does not itself affect the traceability or
redressability of a taxpayer’s injury.264 Rather, a rule strictly applying
the incidental expenditure provision to exclude challenges to executive
actions that are not principally spending programs would preserve the
Flast test’s ties to the injury, traceability, and redressability elements
while simultaneously addressing the plurality’s fears of the judiciary
intruding on the domain of the Executive Branch.265
By distinguishing between Executive Branch and congressional
action, the plurality opens a loophole that the Executive Branch may
exploit without fear of judicial intervention. This new loophole allows
Congress to enable Executive Branch violations of the Establishment
Clause and also leaves Congress as the sole watchdog overseeing the
legality of Executive Branch expenditures.266 Ultimately, the Hein

259. See supra Part IV(B).
260. See supra notes 177-178 and accompanying text.
261. See supra Part IV(B)(2).
262. See Hein, 127 S. Ct. at 2571-72 (resting the denial of standing on plaintiffs’ failure to
challenge a congressional enactment).
263. The taxpayer’s money is allegedly being extracted and spent in violation of the
Establishment Clause in both cases; the only difference is who is causing the injury. See supra note
216 and accompanying text.
264. A discretionary distribution of funds by the Executive Branch has the same impact on the
fisc as a distribution directed by Congress. Enjoining an Executive Branch official has the same
impact of preventing the disbursement regardless of whether it was directed by Congress or made
within the bounds of executive discretion.
265. See supra notes 243-248 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part IV(C)(2). Congress will now have to explicitly prohibit the use of
discretionary appropriated funds if it decides to end an executive-initiated spending program that it
believes violates the Establishment Clause. Since Hein effectively excludes judicial intervention in
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decision makes taxpayers reliant on Congress to check Executive
Branch-initiated Establishment Clause violations since the courts will
not intervene.

Executive Branch discretionary expenditures by denying taxpayers standing in such cases, Congress
remains the only body that can effectively prevent the Executive Branch from funding an
unconstitutional program.
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